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President's Message

The National Military Intelligence Foundation (NMIF) is exceptionally proud of the strong turnout and incredible senior leader support and participation during the 39th Annual Night of Heroes which occurred in the Washington, DC area on November 15, 2023. You can see pictures of all our seniors, awardees and scholars by visiting our website. This year's gala recognized and celebrated 17 incredible currently servicing individuals across six military services, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and the Department of Homeland Security. This year we were proud to partner with the United States Space Force for the first time and help honor their selected intelligence leader of the year for 2023. You can read more about their individual stories at our website.

NMIF is also extremely proud to have awarded twelve scholarships to inspiring undergraduate and graduate level students studying for a career supporting our nation's national security. These scholarships would not be possible without the great support of the LTG(R) Williams family, the Fecteau Family, the Robinson Family, the Friends of COL Scott St Cyr, and many friends of NMIF who collectively donate to make these annual scholarships possible. You can also read more about the class of 2023 and their stories and career aspirations on our website.

We also want to thank the generosity of our Corporate and individual sponsors who enable NMIF to not only conduct our annual awards night, but also continue our mission of ensuring the next generation of intelligence professionals are motivated and prepared for this challenging career of ensuring the safety of our nation. NMIF continues to partner with universities and young professionals for outreach, mentoring and career advise to help get started on a lifetime journey of service to the nation.

NMIF remains a 501(c)3 non-profit organization that is totally dependent on donations to execute our mission statement and publish one of the last remaining scholarly publications, American Intelligence Journal.

2024 will mark the 50th Anniversary of the National Military Intelligence Foundation and the 40th Annual Night of Heroes Gala. Please mark your calendars now and plan to join us in the Washington DC area on Wednesday, November 20, 2024 for what will be an epic event.

*In honor of our 50th Anniversary, NMIF has teamed with another non-profit organization called **Over The Edge**, which executes urban rappelling fund raising events in support of other non-profit organizations. We are proud to announce that we will be hosting this event at the Hyatt Regency Washington on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC on Saturday, March 1, 2024. NMIF values this partnership with the Hyatt Regency as we take on our most ambitious fundraising event to date. Imagine the views of our nation's capital before rappelling down from the roof of the hotel. If rappelling may not be your cup of tea, think about sponsoring a spot for a family member, a service member or "toss your boss." You can find out all the details on the event by checking out our website for more information or by scanning the UPC code found on our website, LinkedIn or Facebook pages that will take you directly to our event registration page.*

LTC(R) Stephen Iwicki, USA
President NMIF

Setting the Record Straight—Maligned Pearl Harbor Intelligence Lessons Put U.S. Service Personnel in Jeopardy and Set Conditions for Defeat

By Dr. Jeff Moore

Getting intelligence lessons learned right, especially from the Imperial Japanese Navy's (IJN) 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, should be duty number one for every official in the U.S. intelligence community (IC). Pearl Harbor was our Nation's most infamous intelligence failure, it got 2,403 U.S. servicemen killed, and it put America on the brink of defeat in World War II. What's more, intelligence lessons from yesteryear are critical to getting right because they help us make better national security decisions in today's tumultuous international threat environment. Getting these lessons wrong sets conditions for defeat.

What's this all about? In December 2001, two U.S. intelligence officials published an article blaming the failure at Pearl Harbor on the homogenous group thinking of "white Christian males," *a phrase the authors actually used in an article that War on the Rocks actually published*. The article in question, "Never Thought they Could Pull off Such an Attack: Prejudice and Pearl Harbor," said that bigotry against the Japanese by key U.S. military leaders and institutions contributed to their underestimating IJN capabilities and intentions, which is one of the many reasons behind the success of said attack. The authors used the words of the then Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, as a key proving point: "I never thought those little yellow sons-of-bitches could pull off such an attack, so far from Japan."

While the article's purpose—to promote diverse racial and gender membership in the IC to improve

intelligence analysis outcomes—is 100 percent noble and necessary, it painted the entire U.S. Pacific War chain of command with too broad a bigoted brush. In fact, the wide-ranging "white Christian male," homogenous, group think accusation is 100 percent false. The historical record proves it. What's more, aside from misinforming our decision-makers, combatants, and aspiring national security professionals, such a bogus lesson condescends to the very people the article is supposed to inspire.

Making the sham situation here more bizarre, in December 2022, *War on the Rocks* refused to publish a response—as it was originally written—exposing the article's dazzling flaws and flagrant falsehoods, citing a policy of not posting replies to past pieces. Not wanting to rock the boat, three other "popular" and "professional" defense magazines, one of which prides itself on vigorous national security debate, also passed, leaving the truth of America's official national security record and the legacy of some of its greatest military minds to hang from the gallows of insolent fabrication. What a terrible shame. Today's IC is full of valorous, unsung heroes and some of the smartest, most dedicated Americans to ever live. They and their World War II predecessors deserve better representation, especially during a time of fake Russian domestic political machinations, some of which were spurred by partisan agitators from within the IC itself. The decision-makers and combatants the IC supports deserve better, too. This article corrects that wrong.

The mindset of those who understood the IJN threat to Pearl Harbor. To get right to the point, there were nine instances in which different sets of “white Christian males” warned that the Japanese could indeed attack Pearl Harbor. All these warnings were documented well before the attack occurred. Their varied warnings demonstrate the opposite of homogenous groupthink. They are as follows:

1. The War Department (as of 19 August 1941). The War Department anticipated a wide range of IJN attack possibilities for Pearl Harbor as of 19 August 1941. They were, in order of probability:¹

- i. Submarine – torpedo and mine.
- ii. Sabotage.
- iii. Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air, or surface craft.
- iv. Air raids, carrier-based.
- v. Surface ship raids.
- vi. Major combined attack in the absence of the U.S. fleet.

2. Secretary of the Navy William Franklin Knox and the Navy Department.² Secretary Knox, in a 24 January 1941 letter to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, said because of increased military tension with Japan, and because of “reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases,” that if war with Japan happened, it would be “easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.” Because of this, Secretary Knox recommended “taking every step, as rapidly as can be done,” to increase Pearl’s defenses. Secretary Knox was not writing for himself. He was writing for the Navy Department as his staff helped him prepare these threat estimates.

The “reports from abroad” referred to the British carrier-based torpedo plane attack on the Italian Fleet at Taranto harbor in 1940. It was history’s first all-aircraft, ship-to-ship attack, and highly innovative.

Secretary Knox additionally said the IJN threat to Pearl Harbor might evolve as:

- i. Air bombing attack.
- ii. Air torpedo plane attack.
- iii. Sabotage.
- iv. Submarine attack.
- v. Mining.
- vi. Bombardment by gunfire.

Secretary Knox wrote, “Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily.” Moreover, he said that attack possibilities 1 and 2 could be carried out “successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated.” Knox even hypothesized the IJN might use a maximum of 12, or a minimum of 2, aircraft squadrons in an attack on Pearl. Notably, he furthermore stated the IJN might launch a surprise attack without declaring war.

3. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.³ Secretary Stimson wholly agreed with Knox, the Navy Department’s threat analysis, and the remedies they prescribed. He wrote to Knox, “I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort.” Secretary Stimson recommended that specific types of anti-aircraft weaponry to be deployed to Pearl, as well as pursuit aircraft, and barrage balloons.

4. Admiral William D. Leahy, former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt.⁴ Admiral Leahy said in Congressional testimony that although a carrier attack on Pearl Harbor would have been difficult, he and many other naval officers thought it was indeed possible. Leahy said, “As a matter of fact, I was always fearful that such a thing might happen to us, and many other officers were as well.”

5. Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet (January 1940-February 1941) Admiral James O. Richardson. In a 25 January 1941 letter to the CNO in Washington, Admiral Richardson¹ hypothesized IJN attack options on Pearl, writing (summarized here by the author):

- i. Japan might attack without warning.
- ii. Attacks might take any form.
- iii. Attacks by IJN ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines are possible.
- iv. Other IJN targets might include U.S. commercial shipping, outlying U.S. possessions, or U.S. Navy assets at sea.
- v. Sabotage at Pearl Harbor.
- vi. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor.
- vii. Attempts to block Pearl's channel.

6. CNO Director of War Plans, Admiral Richmond K. Turner.⁶ As of 27 November 1941, Admiral Turner thought there was a possibility of an IJN attack on Pearl Harbor. He said in Congressional testimony, "I believed war was certain, but in the event of war probably – well, right about the time of Pearl Harbor – I felt that there was at least a 50-50 chance that they would raid Hawaii." He believed that the IJN had two strategic options:

- i. Base in the mandates (South Pacific/Oceania) in attempts to lure the U.S. fleet into battle.
- ii. Raid Pearl Harbor.

Collectively, Admiral Turner, CNO Admiral Harold R. Stark, and CNO Assistant Chief Royal E. Ingersoll issued a 27 November 1941 communique to multiple fleet officers, including Admiral Kimmel, asserting, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." It said that U.S. relations with Imperial Japan had soured tremendously and "an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." It moreover said the IJN was highly likely to amphibiously attack "the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo" and to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL [war plan] 46." Turner believed this communique was enough to cause Kimmel to improve the fleet's defenses at Pearl.

As an aside, War Plan 46, aka Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5, was the U.S. Navy's war plan in the event the United States became involved in the war against the Axis powers in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.⁷

7. CNO Admiral Harold R. Stark.⁸ As late as October 1941, Admiral Stark thought it highly unlikely that the IJN would attack, asserting the Japanese were "not going to sail into us" at Pearl. In November, however, as he read a series of secret diplomatic communiques indicating Imperial Japan wanted Washington to agree to its demands, or *else*, he changed his mind, thinking it was at least possible. He said, "We had the note of the Japanese of November 20, I believe it was, which was irreconcilable with our viewpoint." Ultimately, Stark told Congress, "I can only say that we always thought it possible, but I was not looking for it at that time, and I was surprised that it occurred." He added, "I also was surprised that there were no steps, or that certain steps had not been taken to intercept it and be on the lookout for it."

8 and 9. Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Air Corps General Frederick L. Martin, and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, Commander Patron Wing TWO, Admiral Patrick NL Bellinger.⁹

On 30 March 1941, General Martin and Admiral Bellinger produced a joint estimate of possible IJN attack options on Pearl Harbor and fleet units in the Hawaiian area. The estimate took into consideration that A) Imperial Japan-U.S. relations were "strained, uncertain, and varying," B) past Imperial Japanese offensives usually began without a declaration of war, and C) the supposition that a "sudden and successful" IJN raid against the U.S. Fleet at Pearl might "prevent effective offensive action by our [U.S.] forces in the Western Pacific for a long period" in case hostilities broke out.

Accordingly, the joint Army-Navy air defense estimate of IJN actions was:

- A surprise attack by submarine on ships in the operating area.
- A surprise attack on OAHU, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
- A combination of these two.

The estimate emphasized that “the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack.” It further stated that such an attack would probably come from one or more carriers that might launch from 300 miles out, and that a dawn operation would likely achieve “complete surprise,” among other technical naval air issues.

It should be noted that the term “air attack” in the early 1940s typically meant dive bombers and vertical bombers, which were different from torpedo bombers.

The War Department (as of August 1941) and all eight of these officials thought the IJN was a definite, probable, or realistically possible threat to Pearl Harbor and that steps should have been taken to mitigate said threat. Their Congressional testimony does not indicate if they were racist or not. However, the record clearly demonstrates the diversity of thought amongst a homogeneous group regarding the peril of the IJN.

Collectively, these officials appear to have based their threat analyses on four main factors:

- i. Imperial Japan-U.S. relations were tense and failing.
- ii. War with Imperial Japan was probable or at least realistically possible.
- iii. The IJN had highly effective blue water surface, subsurface, and aerial combat capabilities.
- iv. The U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor was an obvious target in the event of war.

The select few who had access to late 1941 Imperial Japanese diplomatic cables and military communications had even more reason to suspect war was coming and that Pearl was a probable target. And, five of these nine had done homework on Imperial Japanese military history and knew Japan was likely to attack without declaring war, which, at the time, was an absolute prerequisite for war in the American military mindset.

Admiral Kimmel’s mindset. Admiral Kimmel’s perception of the threat picture differed from the above, and it was rooted in more than racism, as bad as that was. Admiral Kimmel’s Congressional testimony reveals a complex picture of thought processes between A) technical naval issues Kimmel knew to be true or thought to be true, and B) what Kimmel thought about his mission and the threat picture.

Technical naval issues Kimmel knew to be true or thought to be true:

1. Kimmel knew the Imperial Japanese consul general in Honolulu was transmitting intelligence on U.S. fleet activities to Tokyo. He knew Pearl was under surveillance.¹⁰ (Much of this intelligence appeared to be facilitated by the Imperial Japanese government spy, Takeo Yoshikawa.)
2. The U.S. fleet was inferior to that of the IJN. Admiral Kimmel told Congress, “The US Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese Fleet in every category of fighting ship. No one in authority expected that the Pacific Fleet could meet the Japanese head on.”¹¹
3. Per the 27 November 1941 “war warning” about faltering Imperial Japan-U.S. relations, Kimmel knew the IJN was prepping for amphibious and naval attacks “in any direction,” including Southeast Asia, and the CNO required him to carry out “appropriate defensive deployment” commensurate with War Plan 46.¹²
4. Kimmel knew U.S. communications intelligence reporting said the IJN’s main task force was training off Kyushu.¹³
5. Kimmel knew that on 3 December 1941, Imperial Japanese embassies and consulates were burning most of their codes and ciphers in London, Hong Kong, Batavia, Washington DC, and many other diplomatic stations.¹⁴
6. Kimmel knew of the Imperial Japanese military penchant for surprise attacks.¹⁵
7. Kimmel knew IJN torpedoes, as of early 1941, would not work in Pearl Harbor’s shallow depths of 30-40 feet.¹⁶
8. Kimmel knew IJN aircraft carriers were short-range vessels, and sailing them and their numerous escort ships all the way across the northern Pacific from Japan to Pearl—3,500 miles—required an unusually high number of oilers and

frequent refueling in exceedingly turbulent weather, a complex and dangerous exercise for any naval force.¹⁷

9. Kimmel knew that every ship in any IJN task force crossing the Pacific would have to maintain radio silence for the entire 3,500 miles, and none of them could afford to be spotted by a single merchant ship or U.S. patrol off Wake or Midway, a difficult task for any navy.¹⁸

As an aside, many IJN staff officers, including Chief of Staff of the First Air Fleet, Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, thought the exact same thing as Kimmel regarding issues 7, 8, and 9 – and then some. Admiral Kusaka and others thought the Pearl Harbor attack plan, Operation Z, was too risky. It was too complex, too far to travel without being spotted, they didn't have the fuel capacity to pull it off, the weather in the Pacific in November and December along the chosen route was turbulent and dangerous, and their torpedoes required deeper water than Pearl offered.

They also didn't have good enough bomb sites, and they didn't have bombs that would penetrate thick American battleship armor.¹⁹

Unbeknownst to Kimmel and the rest of the U.S. national security community, the IJN fixed these technical problems by mid-late 1941. They put special wooden fins on their torpedoes to make them shallow water killers, and they stored extra fuel drums on the decks of many of their ships, a high-risk solution. Japanese engineers also redesigned German bomb sites for their bombers, and they reconstructed battleship shells to use as aerial bombs.²⁰ All other issues they gambled on, choosing to be audacious and daring, per the personality of their exceedingly capable commander, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.

What Kimmel thought (aside from the “yellow bastards” comment):

1. On 18 February 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote, “I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay.” He requested surface ships, submarines, and aircraft to meet these ends.²¹
2. In congressional testimony, Admiral Kimmel said he did not believe it was his mission to defend Pearl Harbor. He saw his main task as engaging the IJN in combat out in the Pacific.²²
3. On 14 October 1941, Kimmel issued to the fleet “Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, Revised,” which said, “no responsible foreign power will provoke war under present existing conditions, by attacks on Fleet or Base.” He did believe, however, that rogue Japanese nationals might attack Pearl from small vessels or sabotage or mine the harbor.²³
4. Kimmel told Congress he did not see specific phrases in the 27 November 1941 threat warning communique as technical naval terms, so he dismissed them. He was referring to “war warning” and “preparatory deployments.”²⁴
5. Based on the 27 November 1941 threat warning, Kimmel thought the IJN was a threat to the waters 825-2,000 miles off Pearl Harbor, so he ordered submarines and aircraft to undertake war patrols off Wake and Midway Islands, he added more Marines to Johnston, Wake, and Palmyra Islands, and he ordered scores of vessels in the fleet to prepare to depart for Japan.²⁵
6. Kimmel “very much doubted” Japan's ability to plan and execute an aerial bombing and torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. He told Congress, “We had had various reports on the Japanese Air Force, and I think not only I, but all the Navy Department were very much surprised at the efficiency of their air force and the manner in which they conducted that attack.”²⁶ This line of thought could be considered to be in line with the “little bastards” comments.
7. In the few months before 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel thought war with Japan was probable but not inevitable.²⁷
8. Kimmel did not think the IJN would attack the United States because “It was national suicide for them to do so,” and later admitted he was

unaware of Imperial Japan's military doctrine of mass sacrifice of the lives of their servicemen – as in mass suicide infantry charges and aerial kamikaze attacks, etc.²⁸

To arrive at these conclusions, Admiral Kimmel had to disregard or place little weight on essential issues he knew to be true:

1. The IJN was the most powerful force in the Pacific.
2. Imperial Japan-U.S. relations were collapsing.
3. Imperial Japanese spies were reporting on the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor during a diplomatic crisis.
4. Multiple Imperial Japanese diplomatic missions were burning their code books and secret papers simultaneously.
5. Imperial Japan was known for surprise attacks.
6. The CNO was concerned enough about the threat environment to order Kimmel to prepare to carry out naval war plans against Imperial Japan.

The bottom line is this: The eight U.S. officials listed, and the August 1941 War Department, saw IJN capabilities and intentions as a threat to Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel did not. In the seminal article, “The Failure of Imagination: From Pearl Harbor to 9-11, Afghanistan and Iraq,” John Dower and Laura Hein argue that it wasn't just about racism. It was also about the failure of Kimmel's imagination. Seemingly, his psyche didn't allow him to survey the breadth of threat data in front of him and conclude, “Maybe they can do it, and my Fleet is an obvious target, so I'd better prepare for the worst.”²⁹ The other officials listed here did indeed think this.

Conclusion

There are several important points to draw from this. First, the historical record proves decisively that, amongst U.S. officials, there was a wide diversity of thought regarding IJN capabilities and intentions and the threat to Pearl Harbor. The fact that these personnel were white, Christian, and male is meaningless. Second, diversity of thought matters not at all when the person in command isn't listening, or flatly disagrees for technical military reasons, racist reasons, political reasons, and the like. Third, Admiral

Kimmel's inability to correctly assess IJN plans for Pearl Harbor was not just about racism. It was also about technical naval issues, perceived command responsibilities, and a lack of creative thinking.

Fourth, the U.S. national security community, including the IC, without question needs a diversity of thought. And this diversity must include minorities and women. America's extraordinary strength in part comes from the melting pot concept, where a diverse group of cultures, races, genders, and people of different socioeconomic backgrounds are vital ingredients in shaping the Nation's uniqueness, its relentless drive, and its exceedingly creative problem-solving abilities. Fifth, as we strive for continued diversity in the national security community, we should explain precisely how diversity plays a part, especially in capabilities and intentions analyses. As demonstrated by Pearl Harbor, the details matter.

Diversity plays a critical role in national security thinking, especially when determining an enemy's capabilities and intentions because people of different cultural, racial, gender, and socioeconomic backgrounds can perceive human behavior and all its complexities in different ways. This includes perceptions of power, leverage, strength, weakness, aggression, timidity, and the like—all ingredients of war preparation, execution, cessation, and managing its aftermath.

Diversity is essential during the inference phase of estimating an enemy's future actions—figuring out “what can the enemy do?” with their combat power, and “what might the enemy do?” with their combat power. Combined with factual data on the enemy, varied perceptions of human behavior—plus creativity—can generate an effective range of viable enemy course of action estimates. Diversity also counters biases, including racism and prejudice, which undermine the analysis process.

A lesser-discussed but debilitating bias to weed out is political partisanship. The task is more difficult but necessary in today's polarized hyper-political environment. Divisive and dehumanizing language from political leaders, “news” pundits, and social media commentators have divided our current body politic to a point rarely seen before.

The recent historical record bears this out. Intense political biases can cause counterintelligence officials to see massive threats based on weak data points. It can cause Department of Justice officials to doctor email evidence to lambast the political opposition. And, it can result in using the IC, or retired IC personnel, in well-crafted, domestic political deception campaigns coordinated with social media companies.

Biased approaches, including Kimmel's and these latter examples, weaken the Nation and help America's enemies. They weaken the Nation by putting racism, prejudice, and political machinations first, resulting in erroneous estimates, which contributes to second-rate policies and operations, or worse.

They also undermine the Nation by abusing the trust of the very people the National Security community is tasked with protecting—the U.S. citizenry. They help our enemies by highlighting our venomous internal discord, our domestic political warfare, which increases the chances of enemy miscalculation.

A house divided against itself cannot stand. Against a backdrop of miserably failed deterrence policies, rapidly growing peer and near-peer military capabilities, aggressive saber rattling, and unabashed invasions of sovereign countries, America needs the strength of diversity of National Security thought now more than ever. Extreme political partisanship kills diversity, however, and we need to recognize that.

*Dr. Jeff Moore is a globally recognized threat analyst and CEO of Muir Analytics, which conducts corporate threat assessments for corporations. Dr. Moore earned his PhD in from the University of Exeter in the UK. Jeff is the author of two books: **Spies for Nimitz**, regarding America's first modern joint intelligence agency in the Pacific War; and **The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency**, regarding insurgency and terrorism in Thailand.*

¹ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, Congress of the United States, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Pursuant to S. Con Res 27, a Concurrent Resolution Authorizing an Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Events and Circumstances Relating Thereto, November 15, 16, 17, 19, 28, 21, 1945, printed for the use of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946, 374.

² *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 279..

³ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 280-81.

⁴ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 354.

⁵ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 368-69.

⁶ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 1963-64, 1988, 2007.

⁷ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings Before the Joint Committee, Part 33*, "Proceedings of Navy Court of Inquiry," (Pages 926-985, Exhibit 4, "Rainbow 5"), <https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/rainbow5.html>, p 939.

⁸ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2006, 2148, 2222.

⁹ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 378-80.

¹⁰ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2597.

¹¹ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2504.

¹² *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2514, 2519.

¹³ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 238, 2521-23, 2254, 2596-98, 2761.

¹⁴ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2596.

¹⁵ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2594.

¹⁶ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2591.

¹⁷ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2596, 2602.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ John Toland, *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936–1945* (New York: Random House, 1970), 195-99.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 198-99.

²¹ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2128.

²² *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2651.

²³ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2618.

²⁴ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2516, 2630.

²⁵ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2516.

²⁶ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2596.

²⁷ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2635.

²⁸ *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, 2637.

²⁹ John W. Dower and Laura Hein, “The Failure of Imagination: From Pearl Harbor to 9-11, Afghanistan and Iraq,” September 6, 2010, *The Asia Pacific Journal*, vol 8, issue 36, no.1, Article ID 3405, <https://apjjf.org/-John-W.-Dower/3405/article.html>.



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